AbsTRACT
Most clinical trials assessing the role of a specific inter vention attempt to answer an explanatory question: under ideal circumstances of risk and responsiveness, can the expert care of individual with a particular condition reduce their risks of a relevant but restricted set of outcomes? Such explanatory trials (also called efficacy trials) are of direct relevance to expert clinicians and their highly compliant patients. Another question, potentially of broader clinical or health care policy relevance is: Does this treatment improve patient-important outcomes when applied by typical clinicians to typical patients? Answering this latter question is the goal of pragmatic trial, also labeled by some as "management" or "effectiveness" trial. The methodo logical and organizational differences between explanatory and pragmatic trials include, among others, patients eligibility (restricted to highly responsive and compliant patients in explanatory trials vs. everyone with condition of inter est in pragmatic trials), experimental and comparator inter vention (blinded and inflexible with strict instructions vs. flexible with cross-over permitted and no blinding), types of practitioners (only those with documented high expertise vs. all who usually provide given mode of care), and outcome measurement (often limited to bio logic effects vs. broad overall health effects sometimes based on administrative data bases on mortality and utilization). Those aspects of study design and conduct and their role in determining a place of an inter vention in clinical practice are reviewed in this paper.
KEy WoRds
effectiveness, efficacy, explanatory trial, management trial, pragmatic trial occurred (within an average of 16 months) in 14 placebo patients but in no patients on active drugs (indeed, this difference in outcomes was so great that a "worst-case scenario" analysis assigning dire outcomes to lost experimental patients and rosy outcomes to lost placebo patients still generated a risk reduction at P = 0.001).
The trial structure in Case 2 served a pragmatic function: Under the usual circumstances of hypertension detection and treatment that prevail in mid-sized Ontario communities, does adding a community-organized offer to identify, educate, follow, and link untreated and uncontrolled hypertensives to family physicians increase antihypertensive care and reduce cardiovascular admissions to hospital? Their "knowledge translation" or "KT" inter ventions, although extremely comprehensive and highly integrated, were simply offered to everyone in the experimental communities, and patients and health professionals were free to use or ignore them. All the more remarkable, then, that in experimental communities, half-again as many patients were started on antihypertensive drugs (P = 0.02), and fewer citizens were hospitalized for heart attack (rate ratio 0.87, 95% confidence inter val 0.79 to 0.97; P = 0.008) or congestive heart failure (0.90, 0.81 to 0.99; P = 0.029). The investigators concluded that extrapolating their program results would result in about 5000 fewer hospital admissions for cardiovascular disease throughout Ontario, 30,000 fewer in the United Kingdom, and 120,000 fewer in the United States, and are proceeding to an economic analysis.
The explanatory/pragmatic formulation of Daniel Schwartz and Joseph Lellouch (which they expanded into a book) 5 is widely shared and applied (sometimes unknowingly and often incorrectly) by trialists and other students of health care, although sometimes renamed. Five years after their landmark paper, Archie Cochrane championed pragmatic trials as the means for determining the "effectiveness" of health care, coupling it with "efficiency" in his landmark book.
6 Others, mere mortals, 7 have also coined synonyms that better suited their clinical teaching and application of these notions, using "efficacy" in the place of "explanatory," and "effectiveness" or "management" in the place of "pragmatic".
For at least 2 reasons, explanatory trials often constitute the initial attempt to determine the usefulness of new treatments. First, by restricting their scope to surrogate or compound outcomes among high-risk, highly responsive individuals, they can generate a quicker, cheaper answer to the question: Can this new treatment work under ideal conditions? Second, if this answer is "no", their investigators and sponsors can cut their losses, not throw more good money and effort after bad, and get on to the next candidate treatment. On the other hand, a "yes" answer from an explanatory trial leaves some ambiguity. Although it might help expert clinicians and their highly compliant patients select individual Trial 2 Accordingly, it was ethical and highly relevant in 2007 for a group of trialists led by Janusz Kaczorowski 3 to ask the PICOT question: P: Among mid-sized Ontario communities, I: does a highly organized, community-based program that combines offering blood pressure assessments to everybody ≥65 years old with education and referral of all new or uncontrolled hypertensives to a source of continuing care, C: compared to the absence of this community--based program, O: raise community rates of antihypertensive treatment and reduce community rates of hospitalization for cardiovascular disease T: over the next 2 years? These 2 trials differed in many ways, but the all-embracing reason behind these differences, and the theme for this paper, was formulated by a pair of French trialists, Daniel Schwartz and Joseph Lellouch, in their landmark 1967 paper: "Generally speaking, the treatments to be studied have to be administered in a 'context' made up of the mode of administration, side-effects and their treatment, diet, auxiliary care, associated treatments, etc. The levels of these contextual factors may be fixed in several different ways, of which two may be clearly distinguished -the levels in the two treatment groups may be equalized if we require information on the true effects of the treatments (we aim at acquiring information) [they labeled these explanatory trials, and we often refer to them as efficacy trials], or they may be separately optimized, taking into account the 'cost' of the treatments in the broadest sense*, if what we require is to choose between two modes of therapy (we aim at making a decision) [they called these pragmatic trials, and we often refer to them as effectiveness or management trials]." 4 Thus, they proposed that the function served by a trial ought to determine its structure. The trial structure in Case 1 served an explanatory function: Under ideal circumstances of risk and responsiveness, can the expert care of individual, severely hypertensive patients reduce their risks of a relevant but restricted set of outcomes? For example, before they could enter the trial, eligible patients were prescribed placebos laced with riboflavin and given a series of clinic appointments. If, on more than one occasion, they missed an appointment, returned more than 10% (or less than 5%!) of their prescribed pills, or their urine failed to display riboflavin fluorescence under ultraviolet light, they lost their eligibility. This "faintness of heart" strategy rejected almost half of them! The "survivors" were randomized to increasing doses of active antihypertensives or corresponding placebos, closely followed, and observed for a restricted set of clinical events and death. No surprise, in retrospect, that this explanatory trial was crash-stopped after catastrophic events * That is, two alternative overall approaches to the management of a health condition might be compared (as in Trial 2 above), and this comparison might include an economic analysis such as cost-effectiveness.
I suggest that their report, and the accompanying Statistics in Medicine commentary, 9 are examples of the misconceptions that led Daniel Schwartz and Joseph Lellouch to write that landmark paper: "It is the thesis of this paper that most therapeutic trials are inadequately formulated, and this from the earliest stages of their conception. Their inadequacy is basic, in that the trials may be aimed at the solution of one or other of two radically different kinds of problem; the resulting ambiguity affects the definition of the treatments, the assessment of the results, the choice of subjects and the way in which the treatments are compared."
I encourage readers to apply the descriptions in the TAbLE to the leukotriene trial and decide for themselves whether the authors' post-hoc analyses and misgivings are consistent with their stated objective of determining "the real-world effectiveness" of these asthma treatments. After doing so, they can compare their conclusions with mine.** treatment options, it does not answer the broader clinical or health care policy question: Does this treatment improve patient-important outcomes when applied by typical clinicians to typical patients? Answering this latter question is the goal of the pragmatic trial.
Pragmatic trials constitute the "proof of the pudding" for promising results from explanatory trials and are (or bloody well ought to be) a major focus of comparative effectiveness research. A "yes" answer to a pragmatic trial -if it tested the new treatment when it is applied by typical health professionals to typical patients for the prevention or relief of outcomes that are important to patients -can provide a powerful evidence-base for its general implementation, especially when accompanied by an economic analysis.
Elsewhere in this issue you will find a trial of leukotriene antagonists as first-line or add-on asthma-controller therapy. 8 The investigators concluded that the 2 regimens were equivalent at 2 months, but not at 2 years. I agree with them up to this point in their paper, but suggest that their subgroup analysis (of just those patients who stayed on their original treatments), their concerns about the absence of a placebo control group, their distress that differences in adherence would hamper "assay sensitivity," their "regrets" that some patients crossed-over to the alternative treatment, and their worry about the resulting "bias toward equivalence" are examples of the inappropriate application of irrelevant explanatory trial ways of thinking to pragmatic trials. Indeed, Full range of practitioners and settings in which a successful inter vention would be applied.
participant compliance with interventions
Closely monitored, and may be a prerequisite for study entry. Both prophylactic strategies (to maintain) and "rescue" strategies (to regain) high compliance are used.
Unobtrusive (or no) measurement of compliance.
No special strategies to maintain or improve their compliance.
practitioner adherence to protocols Close monitoring into how well clinicians and centers are adhering to the trial protocol and "manual of procedures," triggering vigorous inter ventions whenever deficient.
Unobtrusive (or no) measurement of practitioner adherence. No special strategies to maintain or improve their adherence.
follow-up intensity Frequent, highly intense, with extensive data collection.
Usual intensity for this condition and setting, or restricted to administrative data bases on mortality and utilization.
primary outcome A restricted set of events, composite outcomes, or surrogate outcomes, often determined by blinded experts and adjudicators.
A broad set of events of importance to participants, determined in the routine course of health care.
primary analysis Might try to justify excluding non-compliers or non-responders.
Never deviates from "intention-to-treat" analysis of all participants who entered the trial.
** When I do so, their subgroup analysis (of just those patients who stayed on their original treatments) destroys both the validity created by random allocation and their ability to generate a pragmatic answer, their concerns about the absence of a placebo control group are irrelevant in a pragmatic trial, their distress that differences in adherence would hamper "assay sensitivity" (the ability to determine whether a treatment is superior to no treatment) inappropriately invokes an explanatory trial notion where it doesn't apply, their "regrets" that some patients crossed-over to the alternative treatment are, in fact, minor triumphs of their pragmatic design, and their worry about the resulting "bias toward equivalence" is no bias at all, but a valid, important conclusion.
